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THE COLONIAL AIRLINES CASE: TREATIES AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RELATING TO AVIATION*
WIENCZYSLAW J. WAGNERt

On June 4, 1949, representatives of the United States and the
Dominion of Canada concluded an arrangement providing for
the operation of air transportation services between the two
countries. Under this arrangement, which superseded an agreement reached in 1945, American air carriers were authorized to
operate sixteen air routes between the United States and Canada,
and ten routes were to be operated by Canadian carriers.
Among the routes granted to the United States was a direct
route between New York and Toronto, replacing the existing
American route from Buffalo to Toronto. This new route directly
paralleled the existing Canadian route from Toronto to New
York. Canada, on the other hand, received a direct route from
Montreal to New York, paralleling the existing route which had
been operated for many years without competition by Colonial
Airlines, Inc.
Shortly after the conclusion of the agreement was announced,
Colonial Airlines filed a complaint against the members of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, asking that the Board be restrained
from carrying out the provisions of this agreement and that the
agreement be declared null and void.1
Among the grounds alleged as a basis for such relief was
Colonial's contention that the agreement, which had been entered
into as an executive agreement, was in fact a treaty, and that
since it had not been presented to the Senate for ratification, it
had been concluded in violation of the Constitution.
The answer to the question whether the arrangement with
Canada was validly entered into by an executive agreement might
be based upon either (1) considerations involved in the international relations of the United States generally, or (2) the practice
in the field of aviation.
* The author expresses his indebtedness to Mr. Henry L. Hill, Lecturer
in Air Law, Northwestern University Law School, for his help in revising
the final text of the article.
t Teaching Fellow, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Adams, 87 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1949).

212

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

The present article deals only with the second aspect of the
problem, the first aspect requiring treatment in a separate work.
It is to be emphasized that the recent trend purporting to limit
the scope of the Senate's power regarding the foreign relations of
the United States in all fields is perhaps even more distinct in
the field of aviation than in others. This may in part be attributed to the dilatory handling of these matters by the Senate.
The slowness of the Senate's action has been pointed out in relation to treaties as well as to executive agreements requiring a
joint resolution of Congress. Thus, for example, Professor John
H. Wigmore gave "a striking instance of the Senate's brazen
neglect of its duty to the Nation's international interests." On
May 24, 1928, President Coolidge transmitted to Congress a note
from the Secretary of State asking for a joint resolution appropriating not more than two hundred and fifty dollars annually
to meet the expenses of the United States' participation in the
International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts.
The proposal was not open to the slightest doubt or controversy.
However, during the session then in progress and the succeeding
two sessions of Congress, no action was taken by the Senate. At
last, after three years had elapsed, the resolution was passed by
the Senate on February 10, 1931.2
The answer to the principal issue raised in the Colonial case,
whether this was the sort of agreement which could be entered
into by executive agreement, depends largely upon the practice
and precedents in the field of aviation, in addition to the general
American legal system relating to foreign affairs. For this reason, a general review of the international arrangements which
the United States has concluded in the field of aviation is necessary, in order to demonstrate which matters are customarily
regulated by executive agreements and which are reserved to
treaties 3
A. TREATIES RELATING TO AvIATION
In addition to the international agreements dealing directly
and solely with aviation matters, some provisions of other treaties
are connected with aviation, e.g., double taxation conventions
and peace treaties.
, 2. The Federal Senate's Neglect of the Nation's International Interests,
26 ILL. L. Rav. 798 (1932); 3 J. Am L. 283 (1932).
3. For a table of the international arrangements of the United States
relating to aviation, see 1951 U.S. Av. Rep. iv-xiv.
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1. Double Taxation Conventions

The first arrangement of this kind (no longer in force) was
concluded with France in 1932 by treaty." Article III of the Con-

vention reads as follows:
Income which an enterprise of one of the contracting states
derives from the operation of aircraft registered in such
state and engaged in transportation between the two states,

is taxable only in the former state.5

The United States has entered into double taxation conventions
with ten countries; all of them were concluded by treaty. Their
provisions relating to aviation are similar to that already cited,
although most of the recent conventions eliminate the words,

"... and engaged in transportation between the two states...."
2. Treaties of Peace

The treaties of peace with Bulgaria, 6 Hungary,7 Italy,8 and

Rumania,9 all concluded after World War II, deal with various

aspects of military and commercial aviation.
3. Other Treaties Relating Only in Part to Aviation

The treaty signed with Mexico on October 6, 193610 provides
for the return of stolen or embezzled motor vehicles, trailers,
airplanes and parts thereof.
4. Air Mail Arrangments

The Universal Postal Union Convention of Buenos Aires, replacing previously concluded air mail arrangements, 1 ' was ratified by the United States in accordance with the treaty procedure

in 1940.12
4. U.S. TREATY SEP., No. 885 (Dep't State 1932); 49 STAT. 3145 (1935);
1937 U.S. Av. Rep. 403. See Article III, relating to aviation.
5. At present, a new convention between the United States and France
is in force. U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. ACTS SER., No. 1982 (Dep't State
1949).
6. U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. ACTS SEE., No. 1650 (Dep't State 1947);
61 STAT. 1915 (1947). Part III deals with military aviation. Article 29 is
concerned with commercial aviation.
7. U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. ACTS SEP., No. 1651 (Dep't State 1947);
61 STAT. 2065 (1947). The pertinent provisions are Part III and Article 33.
8. U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. ACTS SER., No. 1648 (Dep't State 1947);
61 STAT. 1245 (1947). See Part IV and Article 82.
9. U.S. TATiEs & OTHER INT. ACTS SER., No. 1649 (Dep't State 1947);
61 STAT. 1757 (1949). See Part III and Article 31.
10. U.S. TREATY SEu., No. 914 (Dep't State 1936); 50 STAT. 1333 (1937).
11. The original international arrangement for air mail was signed by
thirty-two countries, including the United States, in September, 1927. 75
LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SER., No. 840 (1928). It was superseded, two
years later, by the Universal Postal Convention of London.
12. Rhyne, Legal Rules for International Aviation, 31 VA. L. REv. 267,
276 (1945).
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5. InternationalPublic Air Law Conventions
The first's international air convention entered into by the
United States was the Inter-American Habana Convention on
Commercial Aviation, signed on February 20, 1928.14 This Convention, concluded by treaty, dealt quite extensively with many
of the problems arising out of air travel in the Western Hemisphere. 15
The next convention entered into by the United States (with
reservations) was also concluded by treaty. This was the Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933,11 which was modified by the Convention of 1944 (the "U.N.R.R.A." Aviation
Sanitary Convention).'7
Finally, there was the Chicago Convention of 1944.18 It was
transmitted to the Senate by President Roosevelt for its "advice
and consent," which was granted in 1946.""
6. Private Air Law Conventions
There have also been a number of agreements concerning
private air law which the United States has entered into by
means of the treaty procedure. The first of these was the Warsaw
Convention of 1929,20 which was intended to unify the regulations
concerning international air transportation. Next came the two
Rome conventions of 1933. The first concerned the unification of
certain rules relating to damage caused by aircraft to parties on
13. Because of the isolationist policy of the Senate, the United States did
not ratify the Paris Air Navigation Convention of 1919, concluded under
the auspices of the League of Nations. In later years, many authors called
upon the United States to join. See, for example, Colegrove, The Interna-

tionalAviation Policy of the U.S.A., 2 J. Am L. 447 (1931).

14. U.S. TREATY SER., No. 840 (Dep'Vt State 1928); 1932 U.S. Av. Rep.
298.

. 15. Latchford, The Habana Convention on Commercial Aviation, 2 J.

Am L. 207 (1931). The Habana Convention went further than that of
Paris in that it recognized the commercial freedom of the air in Article XXI
(cabotage being excluded by Article XXIII, however).
16. U.S. TREATY SER., No. 901 (Dep't State 1934); 1934 U.S. Av. Rep.
265; 1935 U.S. Av. Rep. 185; 5 J. Ala L. 486 (1934).
17. U.S. TREATY Sure, No. 992 (Dep't State 1945); 59 STAT. 991 (1945);
1945 U.S. Av. Rep. 312. The United States signed and ratified this convention in accordance with the treaty procedure in 1945.
18. U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. AcTs SER., No. 1591 (Dep't State 1944);
61 STAT. 1180 (1947); 1945 U.S. Av. Rep. 244.
19. Waldo, Sequels to the Chicago Aviation Conference, 11 LAw &
CONTEMn. PROB. 609 (1946).
20. U.S. TREATY SEn., No. 876 (Dep't State 1929) ; 49 STAT. 3000 (1934);
1934 U.S. Av. Rep. 239; 8 J. Am L. 299 (1937).
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the surface, 1 and22the second related to the precautionary attachment of aircraft.
The above does not exhaust the list of conventions on private
air law concluded by the United States by means of treaties,2
the most recent being the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights of Aircraft of 1948.24 Unlike the preceding conventions, the 1948 agreement is not one of international unifirights
cation, but of mutual recognition of security and property
25
aircraft.
the
of
nationality
the
of
law
the
by
established
7. Arrangements Relating to Military Aviation
In 1941 the United States signed an agreement with Mexico to
facilitate the reciprocal transit of military aircraft. It was concluded by treaty2 and thus constitutes an exception, since arrangements dealing with military aviation have generally been
concluded by executive agreements.
B. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
After the conclusion of the first air agreement with Canada,
the Department of State announced (in August, 1930) that
negotiations with various states concerning the conclusion of air
agreements similar to that signed with Canada were in progress.
Commenting on this announcement, Professor Colegrove wrote:
while most European bilateral air agreements are in
the form of treaties, the Department of the State expects to
negotiate its understandings in the less permanent form of
executive agreements. In view of the treaty-wrecking habits
of the Senate, this procedure may be well advised. Moreover,
executive agreements can be revised by a simple exchange of
notes without having to report a new treaty and a new
ratification.
21. 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 284; 8 J. AiR L. 312 (1937).
22. 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 293; 8 J. Am L. 335 (1937).
23. The convention for the unification of certain rules relative to assistance and salvage of or by aircraft at sea was concluded at Brussels in
1939. Report of American Delegation to the 4th International Conference
on Private Air Law, U.S. CONFERMNCB SEn., No. 42 (Dep't State 1938).

Simultaneously an additional insurance protocol to the Surface Damage
Convention of Rome was signed, 1938 U.S. Av. Rep. 275.

24. Annotated text in 16 J. Am L. 70 (1949) ; text in 1948 U.S. Av. Rep.

554.

25. The convention was ratified by the Senate in 1949. 95 CONG. REC.
11645, 11647 (1949). See also Sweeney, Convention on the International
Reognition of Rights in Aircraft-Early Ratification Desirable, 16 J. Am
L. 61 (1949).

26. U.S. TREATY SE , No. 971 (Dep't State 1941): 55 STAT. 1191 (1941).
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The disadvantage of executive agreements lies in the very
virtue . . . namely the lack of treaty status and permanency. Under Art. VIII, the arrangement with2 7Canada can
be terminated by either party on 60 days' notice.
The method of entering into bilateral aviation arrangements
by executive agreements has been consistently followed since it
was first settled upon by the State Department. No arrangement
of this sort has been transferred to the Senate according to
treaty procedure. Some of them, such as the Bermuda agreement,
may be placed among the most important arrangements ever
concluded by the United States. And many of these agreements
have a much more permanent character than the one with Canada,
which was commented upon by Professor Colegrove.
An important reason for the expansion of executive agreements in the field of aviation is the fact that the repeated efforts
to regulate the enjoyment of all five freedoms of the air by a
multilateral convention have, unfortunately, failed. The discussions at Chicago in 1944 and at Geneva in 1947 were not successful, and it is not likely that such a convention will be agreed upon
in the near future. Mr. T. Burke observed rightly that:
Experience shows that, aside from certain mutually desirable basic principles, the tendency of the governments is to
reserve definitive commitments
for country-to-country [bi28
lateral] negotiations.
The number of air agreements entered into by the United
States is impressive. During the twenty year period ending in
1951, nearly one hundred and fifty agreements were effectuated.
This figure, however, does not represent the totality of American
air relations with foreign countries. It has been a common practice for American carriers to enter directly into agreements
with foreign governments (particularly, in South America, but
in a few cases also in Europe), with the consent and backing of
the State Department, but without
the official intervention of the
2 9
United States Government.
The agreements concern all the various aspects of aviation.
They range from arrangements regulating the entirety of the
27. The International A'viation Policy of the United States, 2 J. Ain L.
447, 460-461 (1931).
28. Influences Affecting International Aviation Policy, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 598, 60 (1946).

29, An interesting study of the agreements concluded between Pan
American Airways and foreign governments is presented by Walter H.
Wager (in French) in 13 RYvu GENERALS DE L' Am 76 (1950).
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relations between two countries connected with air navigation
to agreements concerning simply one particular route or airport.
Many of them have been entered into by a simple exchange of
notes, but some were concluded in a more solemn form. As in
the case of treaties, some have been agreements which did not
concern aviation alone. The agreements may be classified by
subject matter.
1. Agreements Concerning Military and Defense Matters
Most of these arrangements were concluded during World
War II; some relate only to Air Force missions.
Certainly, the most famous agreement of this type was the
Naval and Air Bases arrangement with Great Britain, effected by
an exchange of notes dated September 2, 1940 between the British
Ambassador and the Secretary of State.30 Under this agreement,
the United States obtained a ninety-nine year lease for immediate
establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities in
specified places, in exchange for naval and military equipment
and material which the United States Government transferred
to His Majesty's Government (50 obsolete destroyers).
The agreement aroused much discussion. The Attorney
General affirmed the legality of the transaction, stressing the
fact that the acquisition of the bases by the United States did
not involve any "promises . . .to be performed in the future."3' 1
However, some authors were of a contrary opinion. Professor
Borchard" thought that the exchange was hard to explain on
legal grounds, but stated that Congressional approval might be
deemed secured in the appropriations for the bases and in the
Lend-Lease Act of March, 1941. 33 Criticism was also expressed
by Professor Briggs34 and other commentators.
Some agreements of a military nature were concluded by the
United States with Canada. These dealt with the defense of
30. U.S. Exnc. AGREEMENT SEE., No. 235 (Dep't State 1941); 55 STAT.
1599 (1941).
31. Jackson, Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Overage Destroyers, 39 OPS. ATT'Y GEN. 484, 487 (1940).

32. The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for
Naval Bases, 34 AM. J.INT'L. L. 690 (1940).
33. Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 38 AM. J.
INT'L L. 637-643 (1944).

34. Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 AM. J.INT'L. L.
569 (1940).
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3 and the postNewfoundland, 35 the Alaska Military 3 Highway
7
installations.
defense
war disposition of
Moreover, agreements providing for the sending of United
States military aviation missions were concluded with six South
American countries; an agreement with Denmark concerned the
defense of Greenland ;38 another with Great Britain related to the
defense of Newfoundland ;B9 and an agreement with Liberia
pro40
vided for the construction of an airport in that country.

2. Agreements Relating to AeronauticalTrade
The first arrangement dealing with the reciprocal acceptance
by the contracting parties of certificates of air worthiness for
aircraft imported as merchandise was concluded, in 1931, with
the Union of South Africa. It was accomplished by means of a
note from the American Minister to the Minister for External
Affairs of the Government of South Africa and the latter's note
in reply.4 1 Soon seven similar agreements were entered into, all
before World War II.
3. Arrangements Relating to Pilots' Licenses
Before 1939, the United States had concluded special agreements with six countries, recognizing the right of each contracting party to issue pilots' licenses to nationals of the other party.

35. U.S. EXEC. AGREEMENT SEre, No. 235 (Dep't State 1941); 55 STAT.
1599 (1941).
36. The protocol of March 17, 1942 stipulated that the Highway follow
the airports along the air route. U.S. ExEc. AGREMENT SER., No. 246
(Dep't State 1942) ; 56 STAT. 1458 (1942). A later arrangement dealt with
flight strips. U.S. ExE. AGREEMENT SEP., No. 381 (Dep't State 1942); 57
-STAT. 1375 (1942).
37. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SuR., NO. 391 (Dep't State 1943); 57 STAT.
1429 (1943); amend. U.S. ExEO. AGREEMENT SER., No. 444 (Dep't State

1944); 58 STAT. 1565 (1944) and U. S. TREATiEs & OTHER INT. ACTS SER.,
No. 1531 (Dep't State 1946) ; 60 STAT. 1741, 1751 (1946). Payment for these
installations was also handled by executive agreement. U.S. ExEc. AGREZ-

MENT SER., No. 405 (Dep't State 1944) ; 58 STAT. 1290 (1944).
38. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SE., No. 204 (Dep't State 1941); 55 STAT.
1245 (1941).
39. U.S. EXEC. AGREEMENT SE., No. 235 (Dep't State 1941); 55 STAT.
1599 (1941).
40. U.S. EXEC. AGREEMENT SER., No. 275 (Dep't State 1942); 56 STAT.
1621 (1942).
41. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SER., No. 28 (Dep't State 1931); 47 STAT.
2678 (1931) ; 3 J. Am L. 290 (1932).
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4. Air Navigation and TransportationAgreements

This type of agreement, which is the most frequent and the
most important, was first entered into with Colombia in 1929.42

The next agreement, concluded with Canada, also in 1929, 4
was a model for many other arrangements. Before its execution,
Canadian-American air relations had been regulated by internal
rule-making, 4" the rules often conforming to the substance of
diplomatic notes exchanged between the two governments. The
agreement, entered into by an exchange of notes, regulated the
admission of civil aircraft of one country into the other and contained provisions concerning the issuance of pilots' licenses and
the acceptance of certificates of airworthiness.

The next country with which the United States concluded an
air navigation agreement was Italy.45 The arrangement was

similar to the one with Canada.4 6
Many other arrangements followed, 47 their flow being inter-

rupted only by World War II. After the Conference of Chicago,
many were modeled on the standard bilateral agreement recommended by the Chicago Convention. Many more recent agreements have been based on the provisions of the Bermuda Agreement.

Some agreements concluded in recent years are more detailed
42. 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 271. The agreement related to the operation of
commercial aircraft in the Canal Zone.
43. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SER., No. 2 (Dep't State 1929); 47 STAT. 2575
(1929); 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 273.
44. See Latchford, American-CanadianAir Relations Prior to 1929, 2
J. AiR L. 341 (1931).
45. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SEE., No. 24 (Dep't State 1981); 47 STAT.
2668 (1931); 1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 317; 3 J. AIR L. 109 (1932).
46. See Latchford, Air Navigation Arrangement between the United
States and Italy, 3 J. AiR L. 75, 78 (1932). Among other things, this agreement accorded the citizens of one of the contracting parties the right to
operate within the other country for non-industrial and non-commercial
purposes, civil aircraft registered in the first country, and also the right to
carry passengers or cargo in traffic between the two countries in the operation of a regular air transport line. The establishment of such a line, however, was to be subject to prior consent of the respective governments on
the basis of reciprocity. The cabotage rights were reserved.
47. For example, in 1932 an air agreement with Germany was effected.
U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SER., No. 38 (Dep't State 1932); 47 STAT. 2721
(1932); 1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 310. Since no regular aerial navigation between
the two countries in the near future could be contemplated at that time, the
most important reason for this agreement was the fact that American tourists sometimes brought their airplanes to Germany, and the practice of exchanging diplomatic notes every time was cumbersome. See Wegerdt, The
German-American Agreement Concerning Air Navigation, 3 J. AiR L. 648
(1932).
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than the older ones. In addition to providing rules relating to
the admission of aircraft, they establish the capacity of the aircraft, procedures relating to rates, routes to be followed, and
terminals (often, in annexes to the agreements). Some agreements, implementing previous ones, merely establish routes and
terminals. About fifty agreements of this kind were concluded by
the United States. Of these, the agreement of February 11, 1946
with Great Britain,4 8 known as the Bermuda Agreement, is the
most outstanding.
The principal features of the Bermuda Agreement are indicated in a joint statement of the British and United States
Governments advocating conclusion of a multilateral international and additional bilateral agreements based upon the principles of the Bermuda Agreement, including particularly:
(A) fair and equitable opportunity to operate air services on
international routes and the creation of machinery to
obviate unfair competition by unjustifiable increases of
frequencies or capacity;
(B) the elimination of formulae for the predetermination of
frequencies or capacity or of any arbitrary division of
air traffic between countries and their national airlines;
(C) the adjustment of Fifth Freedom traffic with regard to:
(1) traffic requirements between the country of origin
and the country of destination,
(2) the requirements of through airlines operation, and
(3) the traffic requirements of the area through which
the airline passes 49after taking account of local and
regional services.
In accordance with Article II of the agreement, the air services
agreed upon were to be performed by air carriers designated by
the parties. Each party was to treat the air carriers of the other
as its own, so far as the use of airports and other facilities was
concerned, and to recognize the certificates and licenses issued
by the other party.
Important stipulations were embodied in the Annex to the
agreement, which provided for routes and rate control procedures. Seven routes were established for the United Kingdom
and thirteen for the United States.
48. U.S. TREATIEs & OTHER INT. AcTs SE No. 1507 (Dep't State 1946);
60 STAT. 1409 (1946); 1946 U.S. Av. Rep. 108; amend. U.S. TREATIES &

OTHER INT. AcTs

SER.,

No. 1640, 1641 (Dep't State 1947); 61 STAT. 3089,
SER., No. 1714 (Dep't State

3092 (1947); U.S. TERATIES & OTHER INT. AcTs
1948); 62 STAT. 1845 (1948).

49. 1946 U.S. Av. Rep. 420.
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The agreements concluded by the United States with other
countries prior to the Bermuda Agreement were, in general, less
comprehensive. Usually they did not grant specific commercial
rights for scheduled air transportation services, and the establishment of a regular route required the further consent of each
contracting party. The agreement of February, 1946 thus created a new type of arrangement.
The conclusion of the Bermuda Agreement by means of an
executive agreement aroused adverse criticism on the part of
some senators, who considered the regulation of air relations
between two of the leading air powers of the world of such importance as to require "the advice and consent" of the Senate.
The Senate Committee on Commerce submitted a report and a
resolution to the Senate in which it was said:
Whereas witnesses and counsel representing major American interests . . . have testified as to the prejudicial effect
of such agreement to the United States . . . as well as the
illegality of such agreements unless approved as treaties as
prescribed by the Constitution . . .
Resolved, That the Committee on Commerce advise the
Senate that it is the opinion by this committee(1) That no agreements of this character should be made
except in the form of treaties to be considered and ratified by the Senate; that any executive agreement which
purports to grant to any foreign country the right to
have an air line or air lines nominated by it operate to
or from United States territory without public hearing
in advance and the determination of public interest by
the Civil Aeronautics Board called for under section 402
of the Civil Aeronautics Act, is inconsistent with not
only the Constitution but the letter and spirit of said
Act, and therefore illegal and void, and that any and all
proceedings thereunder should be forthwith terminated
by appropriate notice to the Governments concerned.
(2) That, notwithstanding the International Air Transport
Agreement and the bilateral agreements above mentioned this government is not bound by such agreements
so long as the same have not been ratified as treaties, but
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the President continue
to have the duty and the obligation of passing, without
prejudgment, upon the questions whether any proposed
operation by a foreign-flag air line is in the public interest, as defined in the Civil Aeronautics ActA0
50. Resolution of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, with report, SEN. Doe. No. 173, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

5. Agreements Granting Special and Technical Facilities
This type of agreement is less important from the standpoint
of subject matter and also less frequently entered into than the
preceding type discussed. It largely concerns some local facilities
accorded to one of the contracting parties or both.
An example of this type of agreement is that of January 14,
1950 with South Korea, involving the Kimpo Airport near Seoul."
6. Miscellaneous BilateralAgreements
In this category are a number of varied bilateral agreements.
(Some of them liquidate situations created by the necessities of
war.) They deal with such problems as the appointment of a
civil aviation mission, transfer of an airport, search and rescue
operations, and the like.
7. Multilateral Agreements
The famous Two-Freedoms 5 2 and Five-Freedoms 5 3 agreements,
signed at Chicago in 1944 and known as the Transit and Transport Agreements, were entered into by the United States by
means of executive agreements. The Transit Agreement granted
to each contracting state, with respect to scheduled international
air services, the privilege of flying across the territory of the
parties without landing and the privilege of landing for nontraffic purposes. The Transport Agreement added the privileges
of putting down or taking on passengers, mail and cargo either
originating in or bound for the territory of any contracting state.
In 1946 the United States denounced the Five-Freedoms Agreement. 4 In the notice of withdrawal, it was stated that only fifteen countries had accepted the agreement, and of this number
only two, besides the United States, had developed international
air services to any extent, and thus the agreement could not be
relied upon as an effective medium for the establishment of international air routes for operation by United States carriers.
51. Additional examples which might be given include: The Agreement
of 1947 with Australia, dealing with facilities at Eagle Farm and Amberly
in Australia, U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT. ACTS SER., No. 1732 (Dep't State
1947) ; 61 STAT. 3843 (1947); and that of 1938 with Canada concerning
radio communication in Alaska and British Columbia, U.S. EXEC. AGREEMENT SEm., No. 142 (Dep't State 1938) ; 53 STAT. 2092 (1938).
52. U.S. ExEC. AGREEMENT SER., No. 487 (Dep't State 1945); 59 STAT.
1693 (1945); 1945 U.S. Av. Rep. 278.
53. U.S. ExEc. AGREEMENT SER., No. 488 (Dep't State 1945); 59 STAT.
1701 (1945); 1945 U.S. Av. Rep. 284.
54. 1946 U.S. Av. Rep. 378.
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Another multilateral arrangement consummated by executive
agreement was that in which nine North Atlantic nations in 1946
agreed to maintain weather stations at the site of the stations
established by the United States military agencies during World
War II. 55
The creation of a Permanent American Aeronautical Commission at the session of the Inter-American Technical Aviation
Conference at Lima in 1937 took neither the form of a treaty nor
that of an official executive agreement, but was merely a resolution constituting a recommendation of action to the participating
governments. The national commissions provided for in Article
7 of the resolution were established in thirteen countries, including the United States, but the Permanent Commission never met.
C. THE AGREEMENT WITH CANADA OF JUNE 4,1949

1. The Contents of the Agreement
On June 4, 1949, the United States entered into an executive
agreement with Canada, relating to air transportation.6
Article 3 of the agreement provided that:
Any air service described in the Annex . . . may be placed

in operation as soon as the contracting party . . . has designated an airline or airlines to operate such services, and has
so notified the other contracting party. . . The contracting
party . . . shall . . . be bound to give, with a minimum of
procedural delay, the appropriate . . . permission to the air-

line.., concerned ...
Article 4 (a) provided that the charges for the use of public
airports should not be higher than would be paid by the nationals
of the charging party.
Paragraphs (b) and (c), Article 4 provided for customs exemption and facilities with respect to fuel, lubrication oils and
spare parts of aircraft of the other party.
The reciprocal recognition of certificates was agreed upon in
Article 5. Article 13 submitted to arbitration disputes which
might arise between the contracting parties.
The annexed schedules granted sixteen air routes to the United
States and ten to Canada.
On June 5, 1949, the Department of State issued a press release announcing the conclusion of the agreement. Commenting
55. 1946 U.S. Av. Rep. 468.
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on the new exchange of routes, it emphasized the fact that "under
these arrangements carriers of both countries may both operate
between the largest city in the United States and the two largest
cities in Canada [New York-Montreal, New York-Toronto]."
2. The Gomplaint of Colonial Airlines
The complaint of Colonial Airlines challenging the validity of
the agreement recited that plaintiff held a "grandfather certificate" for the route between New York and Montreal, and that
under the agreement the defendants had declared that they were
bound to grant to Trans-Canada Airlines, as the carrier designated by Canada, a permit to operate on the same route. Accordingly, the hearing required by the Civil Aeronautics Authority
would be only a pro-forma hearing. The complaint further alleged
that the delegation of power in Section 402 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act (providing for the issuance of permits to foreign air
carriers), as modified by Section 801 (requiring approval by the
President) was an unconstitutional delegation of the Congressional authority over foreign commerce to the Executive Branch,
since there were no limitations or standards established. It was
also contended that the defendants had no authority whatever
to cause negotiation of such an agreement as an executive agreement; that they did unconstitutionally conspire to and did prevent the air agreement's being sent to the United States Senate
for ratification as a treaty; that the defendants caused the air
agreement to be entered into without advising the Senate; and
that the agreement had not been confirmed by the Senate as a
treaty; and finally, that said agreement violated Article VI of
the United States Constitution, in that it purported to alter the
laws of the United States by conflicting with Section 402 (b) of
the Civil Aeronautics Act, the anti-trust laws, the tariff laws, and
the Chicago Convention.
Additionally, the plaintiff's complaint stated that the air agreement had all the elements of a treaty and met all the definitions
thereof, since it was permanent in nature and could be terminated
only upon a year's notice. Moreover, it was contended that certification of Trans-Canada Airlines, in view of its enormous
monopoly position, violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
enormous strategic importance of permitting any foreign air
carrier to regularly and frequently operate into the City of New
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York over many hundreds of miles of United States territory was
said to require the consent of the Senate.
In its "Additional Points and Authorities in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction," the plaintiff, in arguing that
the agreement should be considered a treaty, contended that
there was no sound basis for a distinction between a multilateral
treaty and a bilateral arrangement, and that the State Department itself could not establish any distinction between a treaty
and an executive agreement at the hearings before the Senate's
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.5 It was pointed
out that the representatives of the Department of State offered
to the Senate Committee mere expediency---"convenience"-when
queried as to why the agreement had not been submitted to the
Senate. The plaintiff said that it undoubtedly would be more
"convenient" for the State Department if the control of the
Senate over treaties were abolished entirely, and that many
American treaties have been concluded only between two parties;
yet, if the above distinction were to be fallaciously invoked, a
treaty of peace or an alliance might be concluded by an executive
agreement, provided there were only two parties.
The court held that the challenged sections [402 (b) and 801]
of the Act were not repugnant to the Constitution, since before
making any recommendations to the President, the Civil Aeronautics Board was obliged to make findings as required by the
Act. The court also held that Congress had provided certain
standards for the Board in connection with the issuance of a
permit to a foreign carrier, and that Congress thus had the right
to make the delegation of authority. None of the other allegations
of Colonial were passed upon by the court because the consent of
the United States to be sued had not been given. The complaint
was dismissed, but the court did grant an injunction pending the
determination of the case upon appeal to the Supreme Court.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Goldsborough maintained that
according to a prior decision of the Supreme Court, 51 Sections
402 (b) and 801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act delegate plenary
Congressional power to the Executive without any standards,
limitations, or statutory controls whatever, and are therefore un57. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Sen. Res. 50, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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constitutional. He said that the maintenance of the proper constitutional balance between the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judicial Branches of the Government is the enduring and unending obligation of the Judiciary.
The suit by Colonial aroused anti-American feelings in
Canada. 9 The Canadian Transport Board ordered Colonial to
appear to show cause why it should continue operating as a
monopoly between the largest cities of the United States and
Canada. At the hearings, the representative of the Air Industries
and Transportation Association stated that the successful prosecution of Colonial's effort "would make illegal all air traffic between Canada and the United States, and between the United
States and other countries, until new arrangements could be
made." As the result of a conference between the representatives
of the American and Canadian governments, Colonial's right to
perform the service between New York and Montreal was not
cancelled.
It is to be stressed that the United States entered into many
executive agreements of this kind, and it was very unfortunate
that the one which was attacked settled the air transportation
relations between the United States and Canada-a country with
which the United States has always, since the very birth of the
international air services, had most friendly intercourse. International arrangements rarely grant unilateral privileges, but
under this agreement, the American air carriers were granted
more routes than those of Canada. There is no reason whatever
for contending that Canadian air carriers should not be permitted
to fly over the largest American city, while Colonial flies over the
largest one in Canada. Besides, it seems that the Government is
better equipped than Colonial to decide whether this question has
an "enormous strategic importance."

3. Merits of the Complaint
This study is devoted primarily to Colonial's contention that
the air arrangement with Canada could not be entered into by
executive agreement. However, in order to dispose of the airlines complaint in its entirety, it is necessary to consider the
merits of its remaining arguments. If the allegation that some
provisions of the agreement were repugnant to American statutes
59. See Griffin, Colonial Suit Called Peril to Air Pacts-CanadiansWarn
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or treaties was justified, the argument that the arrangement
should have been entered into by treaty procedure might have
been strong.
(a) The custom question. After a careful reading of the provisions of the agreement, it must be inferred that there is absolutely nothing contrary to the customs laws of the United States,
since the facilities involved concern only fuel, oils and spare
parts which are used by aircraft in connection with the performance of their service, materials not regularly imported into the
United States. Obviously, these provisions are in furtherance of
the Chicago Convention, which purported to enhance international air intercourse and improve facilities connected therewith
as much as possible.
(b) The monopoly problem. The contention that the agreement violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is an argument which
might have been advanced against the continuation of the New
York-Montreal service by Colonial alone. The general policy of
the United States, particularly that of the air transportation
authorities, is clearly opposed to such a lack of competition. The
contention that Trans-Canada had a monopolistic position and
that the granting of a permit to it would constitute a violation of
the anti-trust laws is insupportable. The United States cannot
in any way control the system adopted by other states. Whether
they choose the policy of a selected instrument in their foreign
air transportation, whether they have only one national air
navigation company, or whether they promote the system of
competition between several companies is purely a matter of their
internal policy, having no connection with American legislation.
The question must be disregarded.
(c) The "conspiracy" of the members of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. This allegation is quite unusual. Publicity of negotiations
between two countries was never required anywhere by any law
or custom. However, in conformance with the modern trend in
international affairs, there should be no secret treaties. The
Covenant of the League of Nations obligated its members to
register all treaties, and the United Nations Charter maintained
this requirement, although the sanction for non-performance was
mitigated. Internal legislation of some states, enacted after
World War I, prohibited the entering into secret treaties (e.g.,
that of Spain). But all these stipulations provided only for the
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publication of arrangements which were concluded, and never
required public negotiations. Of course, when a constitution
requires the consent of the legislature to the ratification of all or
of some treaties, no secrecy of arrangements entered into is possible. However, when they can be entered into by executive
agreements, publicity may be, and sometimes is, withheld (particularly with respect to arrangements dealing with military
matters). Probably it would be difficult to find a single country
which made public all of its international commitments.
Publicity of the negotiations often could occasion undesirable
interference of journalists or other commentators and impair
the success of the talks. Besides, before the end of the negotiations, it is sometimes doubtful whether an agreement of the
parties will be reached. In the case of failure, it is often far
better not to disclose the fact that an attempt at an understanding had been made. Publicity of the collapse of the talks might
not have an advantageous influence upon the friendly relations
of the countries.
Thus, the statement of Mr. P. Barringer of the Department of
State, at the hearing before the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, is quite proper. 0 Commenting on the
Canadian Agreement, Mr. Barringer said:
It has been the general practice to conduct bilateral negotiations concerning the exchange of international air transport
rights without publicity. It is believed that this practice is
essential if the best possible result, in the interests of the
United States of America, and of all its citizen air carriers,
is to be obtained in the bargaining inherent in such negotiations. This is particularly true when the different air carriers of the United States have divergent views with respect
to the terms upon which such negotiations should go forward. Amplification of the divergency of views of the United
States carriers could easily be diverted to the advantage of
the foreign governments concerned in such negotiations, and
could thus be used to impair the pursuit of the international
civil air policy of the United States.
The secrecy of the negotiations was usual, the Bermuda conference being the only exception.6
In the case of the Canadian Agreement, the Civil Aeronautics
Board held meetings with representatives of the American air
60. Heamings, supranote 57 at 1483.
61. Id. at 1500.
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carriers and asked them to express their views, before entering
into the negotiations. Furthermore, Mr. Tipton, General Counsel
of the Air Transport Association of America, was a regular
member of the American delegation appointed for the talk with
the Canadians.
It was stressed during the hearings 62 that, as a whole, the
agreement with Canada was advantageous to the United States,
particularly because the enjoyment of the five freedoms at
Gander, after Newfoundland became a part of Canada, was
dependent upon the satisfactory conclusion of a new arrangement with Canada. Many interesting figures, presenting the
economic background of the negotiations, were revealed at the
hearings; the cancellation of Colonial's monopoly on the New
York-Montreal route was declared by the Canadians a conditio
sine qua non of the new agreement. However, the question
whether the result of the bargaining with Canada was economically profitable for the United States is not a legal question and
cannot be considered by the courts. The matter lies within the
discretion of the Executive. Agreements of this kind are beneficial to both parties, and Colonial's right to perform its services
derived from the understanding between the two countries.
Therefore, in the motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve
the preliminary injunction, of September 6, 1949, the defendants
contended that Colonial was estopped on equitable grounds to
seek protection of its rights based upon the alleged invalidity of
the Civil Aeronautics Act and the Canadian Agreement because
the very rights it sought to protect arose from such Act and
Agreement.
(d) Pre-determined outcome of the hearings before the Civil
Aeronautics Board. This question may present some difficulties.
Section 402 of the Civil Aeronautics Act requires that the Board
grant permits to foreign air carriers after having found that
they are fit, willing and able to provide the necessary transportation and that such transportation will be in the public interest.
On the other hand, Section 1102 imposes on the Board the duty
of performing its powers consistent with the international agreements of the United States.
62. Id. at 1482, 1495.
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The Canadian Agreement stipulated in Article 3:
The contracting party granting the right shall . . . be bound
to give, with a minimum of procedural delay, the appropriate
operating permission to the airline or airlines concerned;
provided that the airline or airlines so designated may be
required to qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities of the contracting party granting the rights under
the laws and regulations normally applied by those authorities before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated by this Agreement.
Thus, the United States reserved the right to check the fitness,
willingness and ability of the air carrier designated by Canada
and to consider whether the issuance of a permit was in the
public interest. In his letter to the Secretary of State of June
18, 1946,3 the Attorney General stated that:
. . the granting of permits to foreign air carriers is not
affected by any of the civil aviation agreements which have
been concluded, and . . . the Board in each case must still
decide . . . within the broad policy declared in the agreement.
Again, during the hearings on June 8, 1949, the representatives
of the Civil Aeronautics Board asserted that the Board would not
grant a permit without being satisfied that the applicant was fit,
willing and able to perform the service, and that in only one case
has the Board had the slightest doubt about the qualifications of
a foreign air carrier.
However, even if the agreement were simply to provide for the
granting of a permit to a designated air carrier, it would nevertheless still not be repugnant to the Civil Aeronautics Act. Section 1102 may properly be construed as an exception to Section
402. In the light of the requirement that the Civil Aeronautics
Board, in exercising and performing its powers and duties, act
consistently with any agreement of the United States, it may be
said that the usual procedure of hearings need not be followed
when an international agreement dispenses with it.
If the United States enters into an agreement recognizing, on
a reciprocal basis, the airworthiness certificates or the pilots'
licenses issued by the other party, it is because it has confidence
that the contracting party will issue the certificate only under
proper circumstances. The United States is bound by the agreement and could not argue that its internal legislation requires
*
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action of the Board to investigate whether there were grounds
for issuing the certificates. The same principle applies with respect to permits. The United States selects its air carrier for
foreign air transportation. If by the terms of an agreement the
contracting parties are bound to accept reciprocally the choice of
the other, there can be no reason why the United States should
check the fitness of the carrier designated by the other state. In
such case, the hearings would be only pro-forma hearings. This
fact has been well understood by the Civil Aeronautics Board
which asked Congress, in 1943, to amend the Civil Aeronautics
Act expressly to dispense with the requirement of hearings and
findings where an international agreement of this kind has been
entered into.14 Unfortunately, although some other amendments
were adopted, the provisions relating to the permits remain the
same, and the construction of the Civil Aeronautics Act, according to which Section 1102 established an exception to Section 402,
has not been universally accepted. This fact enabled the Senate
Committee on Commerce to offer the ill-founded resolution previously referred to, after the conclusion of the Bermuda Agreement." Fortunately, it was not adopted by Congress.
4. The Justiciabilityof the Question
Even if the court had passed upon the merits of the Colonial
case, it is not at all certain that it would not have considered the
treaty or executive agreement question a political one, beyond the
control of the judiciary.
In its original meaning, "political" signifies "pertaining to the
policy or the administration of government" ;66 but the term
"political question," as developed by the courts, relates to any
problem which must be conclusively settled by the executive or
legislative departments of the government. Many provisions of
the Constitution, which, since they are embodied in this supreme
law of the land, necessarily have a legal character, have been
construed by the Supreme Court as involving only political issues
whenever the Court thought that interference by the judiciary
with the conduct of the "political" departments was not advisable.
In a few cases, the Constitution may offer a basis for this dis64. See Rhyne, Legal Rules for InternationalAviation, 31 VA. L. REv. 267
(1945).
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tinction. Thus, since Article I, Section 5 recites that "each House
shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its own members . . .," the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Colegrove v. Green,6 7 in which the Court decided not to interfere
with the electoral districting of the State of Illinois, could rest
on an express provision of the Constitution. But in most cases
the Court establishes its own classification of political and justiciable questions, without much help from the Constitution. This
accounts for the fact that the Court's decisions are rarely unanimous in these matters, and it has, on occasion, been so divided
that it could not deliver an opinion. Thus, in Coleman v. Miller,68
the Court was equally divided and could not decide whether the
problem of whether the lieutenant governor was a part of the
"legislature" of Kansas presented a justiciable controversy or
was political in its nature. In another part of the opinion, it was
held that:
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state
legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted
withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the
promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. 69
Then the Court attempted to formulate some general standard
for distinction:
In determining whether a question falls within [the political] category, the appropriateness under our system of
government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for
a judicial determination are dominant considerations. There
are many illustrations in the field of our conduct of foreign
relations, where there are 'considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a court of justice.'
Ware v. Hulton, 3 Dall. 199,260. Questions involving similar
considerations are found in the government of our internal
affairs. Thus, under Art. IV, Section 4, of the Constitution,
providing that the United States 'shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican form of Government,' we
have held that it rests with the Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State, and whether it is
republican in form. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42. 70
67. 328 U. S. 549 (1946).
68. 307 U. S.433 (1939).
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It seems unnecessary to give further examples of cases where
the Court declined to deliver an opinion on the ground that the
question presented was a political one. It is to be emphasized,
however, that in the field of foreign relations the Court is prone
to recognize the large discretionary power of the Executive, and
will not disturb his decisions relating to the existence or termination of a treaty, recognition of a state or government, or the
title to a territory. The statements of the Executive in these matters are considered by the Court as conclusive.
In some of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance and the necessity of executive agreements. It is quite probable that it would not be willing to interfere with the Executive action and hold that international
arrangements of a certain type have to be entered into by treaties.
The Constitution itself offers little help in deciding this question,
and although it seems that for the sake of a perfect functioning
of the "Government of Law" as many questions as possible should
be treated as legal and justiciable ones, submitted to the control
of the judiciary, it does not seem likely that the Court would
recognize this problem as such. It is to be noted also that in some
cases, even after having stated that the Constitution has been
violated, the Court declined to grant any remedy upon the ground
that its power did not reach to obligations which were of a moral
71
rather than a justiciable character. '
5. The Treaty or Agreement Problem
As mentioned above, the question of whether arrangements of
the type entered into on June 4, 1949 can be properly entered
into by executive agreement must be determined in the light of
considerations based: first, on the general American legal system
relating to foreign affairs, and secondly, on the practice and
precedents in the field of aviation.
Air navigation arrangements such as the one concluded with
Canada have no permanent character and may be denounced by
either party; they do not require appropriations; they tend to
open the air space of various countries in the world to American
air carriers and thus implement the general American policy;
and they impose no burden or obligation upon the United States
other than the reciprocal recognition of some air traffic rights,
71. E.g., in the case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 How. 66, 109 (U.S.
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which, were the international community better organized, would
belong to every nation.72 Above all, they do not change or purport to change any federal statutes. Therefore, on the basis of
general principles relating to international commitments of the
United States, it may be concluded that air navigation arrangements of this type can be properly entered into by executive
agreement.
Moreover, according to American practice in the field of air
commerce, treaty procedure is required only when the provisions
relating to aviation are a part of an important multilateral or
bilateral international arrangement which, according to the legal
practice and custom, were always entered into by treaties (particularly, the peace treaties), and where because of their permanent or quasi-perinanent character, the number of the signatory
states, and the proclamation of principles of law they may be
considered as acts of "international legislation." In all other
cases, according to the American practice, the air arrangements
are concluded by executive agreements, not only when they are
bilateral, but also when they are multilateral if they relate to
technical questions (e.g., weather stations) or have a purely contractual character and grant reciprocal air navigation facilities
to the contracting parties (transit and transport agreements).
Only because the United States concluded more than a hundred
executive agreements was it possible to develop the international
air transportation pattern of the American carriers to its present
state. Because of the slow and heavy machinery of the Senate,
that body would never have been able to consider and adequately
pass upon all these arrangements concluded in a few years. The
Senate is not properly equipped to deal with these problems. The
circumstances in the field of air navigation change quickly; the
development of aviation, quite rapid up to 1939, made tremendous
progress during World War II. According to some experts, some
twenty-five years of progress resulted from the five years of war.
Usually, air agreements must be adjusted, amended or completely
replaced by new arrangements every few years. How could the
Senate meet this task? Certainly, before any decision could be
reached-after all the investigations, hearings, reports, and dis72. See the story of the fight of the United States for complete freedom
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cussions--many proposed arrangements would have become antiquated. It is because of the wise policy pursued by the American
Government in the field of aviation, effectuated by the conclusion
of many executive agreements, that the United States has gained
its advantageous position in international air transportation
today.
The action of the Executive is in complete accord with the
Civil Aeronautics Act, which provides in Section 1102 :3
In exercising and performing its powers and duties under
this Act, the Authority shall do so consistently with any
obligation assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the
United States and any foreign country and foreign countries ...
This provision may be interpreted as recognizing that international arrangements of the United States relating to aviation
may be entered into either by treaties or executive agreements,
and that they will have the same binding effect.
Section 802 of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides that:
The Secretary of State shall advise the Authority of, and
consult with the Authority concerning the negotiation of any
agreements with foreign governments for the establishment
or development of air navigation, including air routes and
services.
This provision may be understood as expressly vesting in the
Executive the power and duty to enter into air agreements; and
nobody can contend that the Executive performs inadequately
7
its tasks. The resolution of the Senate Committee on Commerce 4
in connection with the Bermuda Agreement has no merit, and the
Department of State properly disregarded it.
Those who agree with the proposition that "there is no selfexecutive test differentiating 'compact' from 'treaty,' and . . .
it was left for Congress to decide within which category any
specific instance may fall"75 (compact being the synonym of
agreement) must agree that Congress made its decision in Section 802 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Senate Bill 12, introduced by Senator McCarran on June 9,
73. 52 STAT. 973, 1026 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 672 (1946).
74. See supra note 50.
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1949 and approved by the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce,"' reads as follows:
No agreement with any foreign government restricting the
right of the United States or its nationals to engage in airtransport operations, or generally granting to any foreign
government or its nationals or to any air line representing
any foreign government any right or rights to operate in air
transportation or air commerce other than as a foreign air
carrier in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, or respecting the formation of or the
participation of the United States in any international organization for regulation or control of international aviation
or any phases thereof, shall be made or entered into by or on
behalf of the Government of the United States except by
treaty.
The first part of the above paragraph would not appear to
affect any aviation agreement heretofore entered into by the
United States, since none "restricted the rights of the United
States." All of them granted some rights which would not exist
were the agreements not concluded.
All the bilateral agreements were concluded according to the
second requirement of Senate Bill 12. No "general grants" have
been provided for. Rather specific grants have been made, conforming to an exchange of routes in every particular case, pursuant to the last clause of Section 802. Thus, the provision of
Senate Bill 12 can concern only agreements similar to the Transport Agreement of Chicago, which is no longer binding upon the
United States, was never copied, and has no chance of being revived in any manner in the future. Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine how this type of agreement could be disadvantageous to
the United States, which was the promoter of the Transport
Agreement. It purported to establish a complete freedom of the
air, and under the system of free competition no foreign air
navigation company could match the American air carriers.
Senate Bill 12 would be understandable in some foreign country
fearing the competition of the United States transportation companies; it seems out of place when advanced by Americans.
Senate Bill 12 purports to take the control over the international air transportation relations of the United States from the
State Department and put it in Congress, but, from its very wording, it is difficult to see what it seeks to change. All non-Ameri76. SEN. REP. No. 482, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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can air carriers operate in the United States as foreign air carriers, under permits granted by the Civil Aeronautics Board and
approved by the President, not under certificates of public convenience and necessity. Should Senate Bill 12 be construed as
requiring non-predetermined hearings, it is unnecessary, as
pointed out above. It would be more reasonable to comply with
the Civil Aeronautics Board's suggestions and cancel the requirements of Section 402.
The last part of Senate Bill 12 purports to impose upon the
Executive Branch the duty of consulting the Senate before joining any international aviation organization, a requirement contrary to the recent American practice. The United States joined
nearly all the international organizations established after World
War II by executive agreements. The Chicago Convention of
1944 was submitted to the Senate for its "advice and consent,"
not because it provided for the establishment and the membership of the signatory states in the International Civil Aviation
Organization, but because it established permanent bases of international air law.
CONCLUSION
From a review of the international arrangements of the United
States in the field of aviation, it may be inferred that the Canadian Agreement of June 4, 1949 presents nothing unique in the
whole system. The agreements deal with all the numerous matters connected with air commerce. A practice developed which
worked very well, and there is neither legal ground nor reason to
require any change.
From the judgment of the District Court for the District of
Columbia, Colonial appealed to the Supreme Court, but there was
not much hope that the judgment would be reversed. On February 5, 1950, a release of the president of the airline was issued
reciting that "with the increasing gravity of the international
situation" Colonial "concluded that it would not be right, in the
public interest, to challenge the Executive Power of the Government to make Executive Agreements with foreign powers," and
that the attorneys had been instructed to dismiss the suit in the
Supreme Court. As the Civil Aeronautics Board and the President have ample power to alleviate the "injustice" done to Colonial, it is hoped that additional air routes will be granted to the
airline, announced the president of Colonial.
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In concluding, it is interesting to note the statement of the
President of the United States in his message to Congress of
June 11, 1946:
Naturally, agreements of this nature to which the United
States is a party are consistent with the requirements of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, are valid under its terms and fully
protect the public interest.
The following words of the Attorney General, written to the
Secretary of State, on June 18, 1946, are also of interest:
The President consulted me in connection with the above
statement, and it was made with my full approval. . ..
It is recognized that there are many classes of agreements with foreign countries which are not required to be
formulated as treaties.77
77. 40 OPs. ATT'y GEN.451, 452 (1946).

